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Charter schools affiliated with the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP) are emblematic of the No
Excuses approach to public education.  These schools feature a long school day, an extended school
year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms and a focus on traditional reading and math skills.
We use applicant lotteries to evaluate the impact of KIPP Academy Lynn, a KIPP charter school that
is mostly Hispanic and has a high concentration of limited English proficiency (LEP) and special-need
students, groups that charter critics have argued are typically under-served. The results show overall
gains of 0.35 standard deviations in math and 0.12 standard deviations in reading for each year spent
at KIPP Lynn. LEP students, special education students, and those with low baseline scores benefit












735 South State Street




Harvard Graduate School of Education






Assistant Professor of Economics
E52-391C









Charter schools are publicly funded but operate with almost as much autonomy as private schools.
The questions of whether charter schools improve academic achievement and which students benet
most from charter attendance remain controversial among both researchers and policymakers. Recent
quasi-experimental evaluations in Boston (Abdulkadiro glu, Angrist, Dynarski, Kane, and Pathak 2009)
and New York City (Hoxby and Murarka 2009, Dobbie and Fryer 2009) suggest some charter schools
produce large test score gains, at least for some students.
The nation's largest charter management organization is the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP),
with 80 schools operating or slated to open soon. KIPP schools target low-income and minority
students and subscribe to an approach some have called \No Excuses" (Carter 2000; Thernstrom and
Thernstrom 2003). No Excuses schools focus on traditional math and reading skills and feature a long
school day and year, selective teacher hiring, strict behavior norms, and a strong student work ethic.
KIPP schools have been central in the debate over whether schools alone can substantially reduce
racial achievement gaps. Descriptive accounts suggest KIPP is producing substantial score gains (see,
e.g., Mathews 2009), but critics argue that the apparent KIPP advantage is driven by underlying
dierences between those who attend KIPP and students who remain in traditional public schools
(see, e.g., Carnoy, Jacobsen, Mishel, and Rothstein 2005). Others have argued that while No Excuses
programs may benet relatively high-achieving and motivated students, those who need the most
support - such as English language learners and special education students - are poorly served (see,
for example, Rothstein, 2004; United Federation of Teachers, 2010). There are few well-controlled
studies that might help sort out these competing claims, and none that focus on KIPP.1
This paper reports on a quasi-experimental evaluation of the eect of attending the sole KIPP
school in New England, KIPP Academy Lynn in Lynn, Massachusetts. KIPP Lynn is unusual among
charter schools in that it enrolls a high proportion of Hispanic, limited English procient (LEP), and
special education students, and so aords the opportunity to evaluate achievement gains for these
important groups. Moreover, while the results reported here are from just one school, a signal feature
of the KIPP model is a large measure of program standardization and, hence, replicability (Whitman,
2008). We might therefore expect similar gains and interactions to emerge from a larger sample of
KIPP schools.
Our results show overall MCAS reading gains of about 0.12 standard deviations (hereafter, ) for
each year a student spends at KIPP, with signicantly larger gains for special education and LEP
students of about 0.3-0.4. Students attending KIPP gain an average of 0.35 per year in math;
1See, for example, the studies linked at http://www.kipp.org/01/independentreports.cfm. The Hoxby and Murarka
(2009) sample includes four KIPP schools in New York City, but results for these schools are not separately reported.these eects are slightly larger for LEP and special education students. Results from a specication
that interacts KIPP attendance with baseline scores suggest that KIPP raises scores more for those
whose achievement lags their peers', while Hispanic and non-Hispanic students gain about equally from
time in KIPP. Finally, an examination of Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS)
performance categories (similar to quartiles) shows that KIPP Lynn boosts achievement primarily by
moving students up from the lowest group. Together, therefore, the ndings reported here strongly
suggest that KIPP Lynn benets the weakest students most.
The next section provides some background on KIPP Lynn. Following that, Section III describes
the data and our lottery-based estimation framework. Section IV presents the results, including
estimates in subgroups and from models with baseline score interactions. The paper concludes in
Section V.
II. Background
Students in Lynn Public Schools (LPS) score about a third of a standard deviation below the Mas-
sachusetts average on standardized tests. This is documented in Table 1, the rst two columns of
which show average characteristics (including 4th grade scores) of students in grade ve, the entry
grade for KIPP Lynn. KIPP Lynn applicants have somewhat lower test scores than the average Lynn
student, with (pre-lottery) math and reading scores that are well below the state average (because
scores are standardized, the averages shown in columns 1-2 measure the dierence between LPS or
KIPP students and the state mean). While the population of Lynn is more than two-thirds white,
most of the 13,000 students in LPS are nonwhite and nearly 80 percent are eligible for a free or
reduced-price lunch. About a fth of both the LPS and KIPP Lynn populations are designated LEP,
while a fth are categorized as special education students.
KIPP Lynn, which opened in the Fall of 2004, serves about 300 students in grades ve through
eight. Each KIPP school sets its own curriculum, but KIPP Lynn shares many features with other
KIPP schools across the nation. KIPP Lynn operates with a long school year, starting in August and
including some Saturdays, and a long school day, running from 7:30 in the morning to 5:00 in the
afternoon. The school emphasizes basic reading and math skills. Students are expected to adhere to a
behavioral code, which includes speaking only when called on in class and orderly movement between
classes. Students receive \paychecks," points awarded for good work that can be spent on eld trips
and other perks. Parents or guardians, students, and teachers are asked to sign a \Commitment to
Excellence," a promise to come to school on time and work hard, among other things.
The KIPP Lynn and LPS student-teacher ratios are similar, at around 14. In most other ways,
2however, the KIPP and LPS stang models diverge. KIPP Lynn's teachers are not unionized, work
an unusually long day, and are expected to respond to students phone calls in the evening. KIPP was
founded by alumni of the national Teach For America (TFA) internship program, and many KIPP
Lynn teachers are graduates of TFA. KIPP Lynn teachers are much younger than those in the rest of
LPS: 88 percent are 40 or under, compared to 29 percent in LPS. Perhaps reecting their age, KIPP
teachers are far less likely to be licensed in their teaching assignment (26 percent, compared to 98
percent in LPS).2
Most KIPP Lynn students live in Lynn and would otherwise attend an LPS school. A handful of
applicants come from Catholic schools or other charter schools. Like most other Massachusetts charter
schools, KIPP Lynn is funded primarily through tuition paid by students' sending districts. Tuition
is typically set to match sending districts' average per-pupil expenditure. This amount is oset by
state subsidies to the sending district when a student rst transfers out.
Statewide regulations require that Massachusetts charter schools use a lottery when over-
subscribed. KIPP Lynn was under-subscribed when it opened in the Fall of 2004, and only marginally
over-subscribed in 2005. More recently, however, more than 200 students have applied for about 90
seats. The 2005-8 admissions lotteries are used here to develop a quasi-experimental research design.
These randomized lotteries allow us to estimate the causal eect of KIPP Lynn on achievement, solving
the problem of selection bias that plagues most studies of school eectiveness.
III. Data and Empirical Framework
A. Data
We obtained lists of KIPP Lynn applicants for the Fall of 2005 through 2008, focusing on rst-time
applicants to fth grade, KIPP's principal entry point. These lists were matched to the Massachusetts
Student Information Management System (SIMS), a database with demographic and other information
for all public school students in the state. As shown in Appendix Table A1 (and discussed at greater
length in the data appendix), 91 percent of KIPP applicants were located in the SIMS database.
KIPP lottery winners were more likely to be matched to the SIMS than losers, a dierence of about
11 percent. Among those whose application indicates that they currently attend an LPS school,
however, the dierential is only 0.029 (s.e.=0.027). This pattern suggests that the SIMS match
dierential is driven mainly by the tendency of private (mostly Catholic) school applicants to remain
in private school if they lost the KIPP lottery, a problem we can avoid by looking at applicants from
2Statistics in the paragraph are calculated from data available at http://proles.doe.mass.edu, accessed January 28,
2010.
3LPS only. As we show below, limiting the analysis to LPS applicants yields eects very similar to
those in the full set of applicants. This suggests that the dierence in match rates does not bias our
ndings.
In 5th through 8th grades, students are tested in math and English language arts (ELA) as part
of the MCAS. Our analysis uses MCAS scores from the Spring of 2006-9. We normalized these scores
(to a statewide mean of zero and standard deviation of one) by subject, grade and year and matched
them to KIPP applicants' SIMS records. The sample used for statistical analyses includes only the
applicants who were subject to random assignment, omitting those with siblings already enrolled in
KIPP (who are guaranteed a slot), late applicants (who miss the lotteries), older applicants (who enter
late if at all), as well as few students with missing demographic data. There are 457 matched students
with demographic data subject to random assignment. Dropping a further 38 applicants for whom we
would not expect to have scores by the Spring of 2009 by virtue of their grade and date of application,
leaves 419 who should have MCAS outcomes and 401 who do. The eect of these selection criteria on
the size of the lottery sample is documented in Appendix Table A2.
Table 2 lists the lottery cohorts contributing to this study, the share of randomized applicants who
won entry to KIPP, and the share that attended. Of the 457 matched students subject to random
assignment, 69 percent were oered a spot at KIPP Lynn and 54 percent enrolled. As the table
makes clear, the earliest cohorts to apply to KIPP Lynn contribute more data to our analysis than do
more recent cohorts, since they've taken more tests. For example, from 2006 through 2009, the 2005
applicant cohort was tested in 5th through 8th grade, while the 2008 applicant cohort was tested in
5th grade only. Overall, lottery winners spent an average of about 1.85 years at KIPP Lynn in our
sample period (as shown in last column of Table 2), but the 2005 cohort spent an average of 2.6 years
in KIPP while the 2008 cohort spent only 0.7 years at KIPP. Since our test score data is weighted
toward the earliest KIPP cohorts, the results reported here should be interpreted as the eect of a
relatively new school on its rst cohorts of students.
Table 1 reports descriptive information for 5th graders attending LPS and KIPP Lynn during our
study period, as well as for the estimation sample of KIPP Lynn applicants. KIPP Lynn applicants look
much like the students who ultimately enroll in KIPP. Importantly, lottery winners and losers appear
to be similar, a fact documented in column (4) of Table 1, which reports dierences in demographic
characteristics and baseline scores between those who win and lose the lottery. By virtue of random
assignment, we would expect these dierences to be small. In practice, however, our reconstruction
of the KIPP lotteries is based on spreadsheets that may be missing some information. In particular,
for some applicants, lottery status was over-written with enrollment status. We attempted to x
this by reviewing the lottery records with school sta. It is therefore encouraging that most pre-
4treatment characteristics come out balanced. Specically, regression estimates with pre-treatment
characteristics on the left-hand side show only one signicant dierence between winners and losers
(proportion Asian), and the F-statistic from a joint test of balance on all observable characteristics
gives little cause for concern. Dierences in LEP rates, baseline scores, and the proportion of applicants
in fourth grade shrink further when adjusted for the demographic variables in the upper half of Table
1, as can be seen in column (5).3
While Table 1 shows that lottery winners and losers are similar at the time of the lottery, subsequent
attrition may generate important dierences in the follow-up sample if the attrition process is non-
random. Of particular concern is the possibility that lottery losers are more likely to be missing. The
MCAS is a statewide test, but KIPP applicants who enroll in private school or leave Massachusetts
altogether are lost to follow-up.
Table 3 probes for evidence of dierential attrition between lottery winners and losers. Given
the entry cohorts and tested grades of the lottery applicants, we expect to observe 971 test scores
after the lottery (Appendix Table A3 lists the number of test scores expected and observed for each
applicant cohort). Among those who lose the lottery, about 85% of expected scores were found. This
rate is about ve percentage points higher for those who win the lottery, a dierence that shrinks and
become insignicant with the inclusion of demographic controls.4 The small follow-up dierentials
documented in Table 3 seem unlikely to impart substantial selection bias in our impact analysis.
B. 2SLS Strategy
We are interested in the causal eect of attending KIPP Lynn on test scores. This eect is modeled
as a function of time spent attending KIPP Lynn in the equation
yigt = t + g +
X
j
jdij + 0Xi + sigt + igt; (1)
where yigt denotes the scores of student i tested in year t in grade g. The variable sigt records
calendar years spent at KIPP Lynn as of the test date, counting any repeated grades. The (average)
causal eect of interest is . The terms t and g are year-of-test and grade-of-test eects, while Xi
is a vector of demographic controls with coecient , and igt is an error term that captures random
uctuation in test scores. The dummies dij indicate three of the four KIPP Lynn application cohorts,
indexed by j. Note that application cohort is an important control variable because the probability
3The estimates in column (4) control for year and grade of application (except for the row for application grade). The
column (5) models add all demographic controls with the exception of LEP status to the regressions for LEP, baseline
scores, and 4th grade application status.
4The attrition regressions include the same controls as the rst stage equations discussed in the next section.
5of winning a seat at KIPP varies from year to year.5
We use randomly assigned lottery oers as an instrument for sigt. The rst stage equation takes
the form:
sigt = t + g +
X
j
jdij +  0Xi + Zi + igt; (2)
where t and g are year-of-test and grade eects. The excluded instrument is the lottery oer dummy
Zi, with rst stage eect . The reduced form generated by this system comes from substituting (2)
for sigt in (1). The reduced form eect is the coecient on Zi in a regression of yigt on Zi, with the
same controls and data structure as for equations (1) and (2). Because the model is just-identied,
2SLS estimates of  are given by the ratio of reduced form to rst stage coecients.
IV. Results
The lottery rst stage is a little over 1.2 years, as can be seen in the rst column of Table 4. This
estimate indicates that, at the time they were tested, lottery winners had spent an average of 1.2
years more at KIPP than lottery losers. The addition of demographic variables and baseline scores
has almost no eect on the rst stage estimates.6 In a world with perfect lottery compliance, no
late entry or grade repetition, and no loss to follow-up, the rst stage in our sample would be 1.75,
but this is reduced by the fact that some winners never enroll in KIPP or leave before nishing and
some losers end up in KIPP later.7 On the other hand, although KIPP schools are sometimes said to
encourage weaker students to leave (see, e.g., the discussion in chapter 46 of Mathews, 2009), we found
that lottery winners were about as likely as losers to change schools in grades 6-8, a result discussed
further, below.
Lottery winners score about 0.4 standard deviations higher than losers in math. This reduced-form
estimate is reported in column (2) in the top half of Table 4. This result is robust to the inclusion
of demographic controls and baseline scores. The reduced-form estimates for ELA, reported in the
bottom half of the table, are more variable across specications, ranging from 0.14 0:22 as the set of
5Siblings who apply together are more likely to get in, since a winning sibling improves the loser's position on the
waiting list. All specications therefore include a dummy indicating the presence of an applicant's sibling in the lottery,
as well as the interaction of this dummy with year of application. Note that applicants with siblings already enrolled in
KIPP are excluded from the analysis sample, since they are guaranteed admission.
6We report separate rst stages for math and ELA because samples dier slightly by subject.
7The 2005 cohort contributes one score after one year (in 5
thgrade), one after two years (in 6
thgrade), one after three
years (in 7
thgrade), and one after four years (in 8
thgrade) for an average of 2.5 years in KIPP across grades. A similar
calculation for the other cohorts, who are seen in fewer grades, produces 2.0 potential years in KIPP for the 2006 cohort,
1.5 potential years in KIPP for the 2007 cohort, and one potential year in KIPP for the 2008 cohort. The average of
these is 1.75.
6controls changes. This variation probably reects the modest imbalance between winners and losers
in the proportion LEP documented in Table 1. The estimated eect on ELA is marginally signicant
in models with demographic and baseline score controls.
Because the rst-stage coecients are over one, the 2SLS estimates are smaller than the reduced-
form estimates, though they also have a dierent interpretation. The 2SLS estimates imply that math
scores increase by about 0:35 for each year at KIPP Lynn. The more modest 2SLS estimates for
ELA show per-year gains on the order of 0:1   0:15. The most precise of these is 0:12, estimated
in models with demographic and baseline score controls (s.e.=0.058). These eects are remarkably
similar to the middle school results from a sample of No Excuses charter schools in Boston, as reported
in Abdulkadiro glu et al. (2009). Measured against Lynn's Hispanic-White score gaps of about 0:5
in math and 0:6 in ELA, both the math and ELA eects are substantial. Perhaps surprisingly, the
OLS estimates of math eects reported in column (4) of Table 4 are close to the corresponding 2SLS
estimates, though the OLS estimates of ELA eects are a little larger. The similarity of OLS and
2SLS estimates (and the fact that the OLS estimates are insensitive to controls) suggests that, in the
sample of KIPP Lynn applicants, selection bias is minor.8
We noted above that our reconstruction of the KIPP Lynn lotteries may have been imperfect
because some lottery oer data was replaced with enrollment data. This is probably more of a
concern for older applicants, who are less likely than 4th grade applicants to have accepted a KIPP
oer (since 5th grade and older applicants were required to repeat their current grade). Therefore, as
a robustness check, Table 4 reports results for the sample of 4th grade applicants only. These results,
shown in columns (5) and (6), are similar to the main ndings. Likewise, because match rates from
lottery data to SIMS data were higher for students coming from a Lynn public school, we report
results from the sample of LPS applicants only in columns (7) and (8). These too are close to the
ndings reported for the full sample.
To get a sense of whether the KIPP Lynn treatment eect has been increasing over time, Figure
1 plots reduced-form estimates by cohort and grade, starting in fourth grade to document baseline
dierences.9 Not surprisingly, treatment eects estimated at this level of disaggregation are fairly
noisy and few are individually signicant. On the other hand, the math results appear to have
increased somewhat for more recent applicant cohorts, while the evolution through grades suggests
8We also experimented with an alternative IV model where the instrument is the grade- and cohort-specic potential
time in KIPP for winners. This is the rst-stage specication used by Hoxby and Murarka (2009). The rst stage in
this case indicates that each potential year in KIPP causes about 0.7 actual years in KIPP, as shown in column (1) of
Appendix Table A4. The corresponding 2SLS results, reported in column (6) of Table A4, are slightly more precise but
otherwise similar to the 2SLS estimates reported in Table 4.
9The sample used to construct Figure 1 includes 4th grade applicants only. The reduced-form estimates plotted in
the gure come from models that include demographic controls.
7a cumulative eect. Consistent with the smaller pooled estimates for ELA, the ELA estimates in
the plot are mostly smaller than the math estimates and take longer to emerge. The math and ELA
results both show an (insignicant) negative eect in 8th grade but this result comes from a single
cohort - KIPP Lynn's second, admitted in 2005 - for which the rst stage is also relatively small.
A. Subgroups and Interactions
KIPP Lynn serves more Hispanic, LEP, and special education students than the typical charter school
in the Northeast. Table 5 looks at eects in these subgroups. The rst two columns of the table show
math impacts that are markedly larger for LEP students, while ELA score gains come almost entirely
from the LEP group. Results broken down by special education status look much like the analysis by
LEP. On the other hand, the estimates are reasonably similar for Hispanic and non-Hispanic students,
as can be seen in columns (5) and (6).
Charter skeptics have sometimes argued that while the most motivated and able students may
benet from charter school attendance, weaker students lose out. For instance, Rothstein (2004,
p. 82) writes about KIPP: \They select from the top of the ability distribution those lower-class
children with innate intelligence, well-motivated parents, or their own personal drives, and give these
children educations they can use to succeed in life." Note that this is a concern about treatment eect
heterogeneity rather than selection bias.
We explored this type of treatment eect heterogeneity by estimating a model that adds an inter-
action between applicants' baseline (4th grade) scores and years at KIPP Lynn, normalized so that the
main eect of years at KIPP Lynn is evaluated at the mean of the baseline score distribution. Table
6 shows that KIPP Lynn raises achievement more for weaker students. Children with baseline scores
half a standard deviation below the applicant mean appear to get about an additional achievement
boost of about 0.05 0.08 from each year at KIPP, relative to a student with baseline scores at the
mean. This nding echoes a similar negative interaction with baseline scores reported in our Boston
study (Abdulkadiro glu et al., 2009).
As part of the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) accountability process, the Massachusetts Department
of Elementary and Secondary Education reports the distribution of MCAS scores across four mutually
exclusive categories: advanced, procient, needs improvement, and warning. Under current NCLB
provisions, a school meets the required Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) standard if the overall school
average and various subgroup averages are procient or better. Table 7 reports the eect of KIPP
Lynn on the likelihood of falling into each of the MCAS score groups. A year at KIPP Lynn reduces
the probability that students perform at the warning level by 10 percentage points for math, with an
equal increase in the likelihood of reaching an advanced level. For ELA, the table shows a 5 percentage
8point drop in the warning group, and with an equal increase in the probability of attaining the needs
improvement category. While the gains are more impressive for math than for ELA, it is noteworthy
that achievement gains in both subjects come from a shift out of the lowest group.
B. School Switching
Finally, we look briey at whether the positive eects reported here might be explained by high rates
of exit from KIPP. This inquiry is motivated by evidence that KIPP schools in the San Francisco
Bay area experienced high rates of exit, though it is not clear whether these rates are out of line with
those in the host public school districts (Woodworth, et al., 2008). Our school switching analysis uses
the same empirical framework as that used to investigate attrition in Table 3, though the dependent
variable in this case indicates whether a KIPP applicant changes schools between grades ve and eight.
These results, reported in the rst row of Table 8, show that KIPP Lynn lottery winners were much
less likely to change schools than those who lost the lottery. This dierence is attributable to the fact
that KIPP Lynn students stay at KIPP in the transition from 5th to 6th grade, when LPS students
move from elementary to middle school. Excluding the transition from 5th to 6th grade, the results
show no dierence in switching between winners and losers, as can be seen in the last row of Table 8.
This weighs against the view that exit from KIPP matters for the achievement gains reported here.
V. Concluding Comments
Our estimates suggest that KIPP Lynn generates substantial score gains for lottery winners, with
eects on the order of 0.35 for math and 0.12 for ELA. Score gains are largest for special education
students and students with limited English prociency, while Hispanic and non-Hispanic students
appear to benet about equally from time in KIPP. A specication that interacts KIPP attendance
with baseline scores indicates that eects are also larger for those who start out lagging their peers
than for more advanced students. An analysis of eects on MCAS performance categories shows that
KIPP lifts students out of the lowest performance category in both math and ELA.
A recent charter study concludes that newly opened charter schools do worse than traditional public
schools (Zimmer, Gill, Booker, Lavertu, Sass and Witte 2009). It's therefore worth emphasizing that
the results reported here are from the rst few cohorts to attend KIPP Lynn. Finally, we note that
while our results are for a single school, the KIPP organization runs similar schools across the country.
Key elements of the KIPP program also feature in other No Excuses charter schools, such as those
in our Boston sample. Our ndings suggest the major elements of this replicable model combine to
increase achievement overall, with the largest gains coming from relatively weak students.
9Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance
Means Balance regressions
Lynn Public 5th 
graders
KIPP Lynn 5th 
graders





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Hispanic 0.418 0.565 0.538 -0.052 -
(0.053)
Black 0.173 0.235 0.254 0.027 -
(0.044)
White 0.296 0.168 0.182 -0.010 -
(0.040)
Asian 0.108 0.021 0.022 0.026* -
(0.015)
Female 0.480 0.474 0.484 -0.010 -
(0.054)
Free/reduced price lunch 0.770 0.842 0.825 -0.030 -
(0.041)
Special Education 0.185 0.189 0.197 -0.013 -
(0.042)
Limited English Proficiency 0.221 0.172 0.206 -0.075 -0.060
(0.047) (0.044)
Baseline Math Score -0.307 -0.336 -0.390 0.097 0.066
(0.114) (0.109)
Baseline Verbal Score -0.356 -0.399 -0.438 0.054 0.028
(0.118) (0.109)
Fourth Grade Applicant 0.768 0.056 0.068
(0.046) (0.047)
F-value from joint test 0.820 0.998
p-value from F-test 0.621 0.409
Nf d h i N for demographics 3964 3964 285 285 457 457 457 457 457 457
N for baseline Math 3808 284 446 446 446
N for baseline ELA 3805 284 447 447 447
Notes:  Columns (1), (2), and (3) report means of the variable indicated in each row. Column (1) reports 4th grade means for students 
that attended 5th grade in Lynn public schools in Fall 2005-2008.  Column (2) reports 4th grade means for all students who attended 
KIPP Academy Lynn in these years, and column (3) reports 4th grade means for lottery applicants to KIPP Academy Lynn over the 
same period.  The sample for columns (3)-(6) is restricted to randomized applicants with baseline demographics and excludes students 
who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior to applying.  Column (4) reports coefficients from regressions of the variable indicated in 
each row on an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. These regressions include dummies for year of application 
and exclude students with sibling priority and those without baseline demographics.  With the exception of the "4th grade applicant" 
row, regressions also include application grade dummies.  Column (5) adds all of the demographic controls with the exception of LEP 
to the regressions for LEP, baseline scores, and 4th grade application. F-tests are for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on 
winning the lottery in all regressions are equal to zero. These tests statistics are calculated for the subsample that has non-missing 
values for all variables tested.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%e calendar years (Spring) in 
 gives the total number of 
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Percent offered Percent attended
Average years at 
KAL (winners)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005-2006 2006-2009 5-8 138 107 0.925 0.673 2.556
2006-2007 2007-2009 5-7 117 86 0.674 0.535 2.293
2007-2008 2008-2009 5-6 167 127 0.654 0.567 1.711
2008-2009 2009 5 207 137 0.540 0.401 0.703
All cohorts 2006-2009 5-8 629 457 0.687 0.536 1.847
Notes:  This table reports characteristics of the four lotteries conducted at KIPP Academy Lynn from 2005 to 2008.  Column (2) reports th
which test scores are observed for applicants in each lottery cohort, and column (3) reports the corresponding outcome grades.  Column (4)
applicants in each year, and column (5) gives the number of applicants in the lottery sample, which excludes sibling applicants, late applican
applicants without baseline demographics, applicants who could not be matched to the MCAS data, and applicants who had completed 6th or 7t
lottery.  Columns (6)-(8) give summary statistics for the lottery sample.n-missing on an 
es.  The regression in 
th a contemoraneous 
 is restricted to 
ustered at the 
Table 3:  Attrition







Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Math 0.851 0.052* 0.041 0.044
(0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
971 971 957
ELA 0.855 0.048 0.031 0.041
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031)
971 971 958
Notes:   This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if the outcome test score is no
indicator variable equal to one if the student won the lottery. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummi
column (2) includes dummies for outcome grade, year of baseline, application grade, and year of application interacted wi
sibling applicant dummy.  Column (3) adds demographic variables, and column (4) adds baseline test scores.   The sample
cohorts for which we should observe follow-up scores and excludes applicants with sibling priority.  Robust standard errors (cl
student level) are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Lynn public schools at baseline th
ied to KIPP Lynn between 
d, and all regressions include 
nt dummy, and grade of 
ucation, limited english 
ts from instrumenting years in 
ontrols.  Columns (5) and (6) 
 and OLS results using only 
dent level) are reported in 
Table 4:  Lottery Results
all applicants 4  grade applicants 
First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS OLS
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Math Basic 1.222*** 0.431*** 0.353*** 0.304*** 0.368*** 0.272*** 0.342*** 0.308***
(0.063) (0.116) (0.095) (0.048) (0.100) (0.052) (0.109) (0.054)
865 865 865 865 752 752 704 704
Demographics 1.232*** 0.392*** 0.318*** 0.316*** 0.356*** 0.302*** 0.309*** 0.336***
(0.065) (0.105) (0.084) (0.041) (0.087) (0.045) (0.098) (0.046)
865 865 865 865 752 865 704 704
Demographics
Baseline Scor
1.2  &  28*** 0.425*** 0.346*** 0.317*** 0.336*** 0.319*** 0.341*** 0.346***
(0 es .066) (0.066) (0.052) (0.032) (0.055) (0.036) (0.064) (0.038)
856 856 856 856 746 746 696 696
ELA Basic 1.223*** 0.183 0.150 0.170*** 0.188* 0.138*** 0.217* 0.168***
(0.063) (0.117) (0.094) (0.049) (0.099) (0.052) (0.115) (0.057)
866 866 866 866 751 751 705 705
Demographics 1.235*** 0.118 0.095 0.172*** 0.152* 0.164*** 0.150 0.180***
(0.066) (0.097) (0.077) (0.041) (0.080) (0.043) (0.092) (0.047)
866 866 866 866 751 866 705 705
Demographics
Baseline Scor
1.2  &  34*** 0.149** 0.120** 0.172*** 0.111* 0.168*** 0.132* 0.182***
(0 es .066) (0.073) (0.058) (0.031) (0.059) (0.033) (0.068) (0.036)
856 856 856 856 744 744 698 698
Notes:   This table reports the coefficients from regressions of test scores on years spent at KIPP Academy Lynn. The sample uses students who appl
2005 and 2008.  It is restricted to students with baseline demographic characteristics and excludes applicants with sibling priority. Grades are poole
grade dummies.  All regressions also include year of test dummies, year of application dummies interacted with a contemporaneous sibling applica
application dummies.  Some regressions add demographic controls, which include dummies for female, black, hispanic, asian, other race, special ed
proficiency, free/reduced price lunch, and a female*minority interaction.  Columns (1)-(3) report the first stage, reduced from, and 2SLS coefficien
KIPP Lynn using the lottery win/loss dummy.  Column (4) reports the coefficients from OLS regressions of test scores on years in KIPP Lynn and c
report 2SLS and OLS results using only students that applied to KIPP Lynn in the year after finishing 4th grade.  Columns (7) and (8) report 2SLS
students that indicated Lynn Public School attendance prior to the lottery on their KIPP Lynn applications.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the stu
parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 5:  Lottery Results in Subsamples
LEP Non-LEP SPED Non-SPED Hispanic Non-hispanic
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Math Basic 0.700*** 0.208** 0.484** 0.298*** 0.413*** 0.247
(0.182) (0.101) (0.207) (0.092) (0.118) (0.150)
132 733 175 690 462 403
Demographics 0.628*** 0.254*** 0.527** 0.271*** 0.302*** 0.358**
(0.197) (0.093) (0.215) (0.087) (0.106) (0.152)
132 733 175 690 462 403
Demographics and Baseline 
Scores
0.451*** 0.312*** 0.441*** 0.325*** 0.346*** 0.331***
(0.155) (0.056) (0.146) (0.053) (0.074) (0.076)
131 725 174 682 457 399
ELA Basic 0.457** -0.016 0.346 0.077 0.217* 0.004
(0.203) (0.095) (0.216) (0.087) (0.117) (0.157)
131 735 176 690 463 403
Demographics 0.416** 0.019 0.220 0.038 0.068 0.119
(0.183) (0.084) (0.216) (0.079) (0.093) (0.150)
131 735 176 690 463 403
Demographics and Baseline 
Scores
0.384*** 0.051 0.298* 0.049 0.121 0.086
(0.140) (0.062) (0.162) (0.058) (0.075) (0.099)
130 726 174 682 457 399
Notes:  This table reports results analogous to the 2SLS estimates in Table 4.  The reported coefficients are 2SLS estimates in subsets of the lottery sample.  
The sample for each regression is restricted to individuals who were classified as limited english proficient (LEP), special education (SPED), or Hispanic at 
baseline in columns (1) , (3) and (5), compared to those who were not in columns (2) , (4) and (6), respectively.   The LEP estimation sample includes 79  
students, while the non-LEP sample includes 319.  The SPED estimation sample includes 78 students, while the non-SPED sample includes 320.  The 
Hispanic estimation sample includes 220  students, while the non-Hispanic sample includes 178.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are 
reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 6:  Baseline Test Score Interactions
Baseline Scores Demographics + Scores
Main effect Interaction Main effect Interaction
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Math 0.362*** -0.087** 0.367*** -0.106***
(0.057) (0.043) (0.054) (0.041)
856 856
ELA 0.128** -0.147*** 0.139** -0.157***
(0.064) (0.051) (0.057) (0.045)
856 856
Notes:   This table reports results analogous to the 2SLS estimates in Table 4, but specifications 
now include an interaction of baseline test score with years at KIPP Academy Lynn.   These 
regressions use the KIPP Lynn offer dummy and offer*baseline score as instruments for years 
in KIPP Lynn and the interaction term.  A main effect of baseline test score is also included in 
all regressions.  Baseline scores are mean-zero in the estimation sample so that the main effects 
of years in KIPP Lynn are at the mean.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) 
are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 7:  Effects on MCAS Performance Levels
Warning Needs Improvement Proficient Advanced
Subject (1) (2) (3) (4)
Math -0.100*** -0.019 0.016 0.103***
(0.028) (0.038) (0.039) (0.026)
856 856 856 856
ELA -0.055*** 0.068* -0.005 -0.003
(0.020) (0.037) (0.037) (0.017)
856 856 856 856
Notes:   This table reports the coefficients from 2SLS regressions of indicator variables for each of the 4 
MCAS performance levels on years in KIPP Lynn instrumented by the lottery offer dummy. Grades are 
stacked.  Controls include demographics and baseline scores.  Robust standard errors (clustered at the 
student level) are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%* i i i
Table 8:  School Switching Regressions
Differential Follow-up (winner - loser)





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Any switch
0.504 -0.278*** -0.291*** -0.294***
(0.044) (0.044) (0.045)
419 419 412
6th grade school is 
different from 5th
0.855 -0.495*** -0.503*** -0.509***
(0.061) (0.060) (0.059)
294 294 291
Any switch excluding 5th 
to 6th transition
0.081 -0.004 -0.006 -0.004
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
419 419 412
Notes:   This table reports coefficients from regressions of an indicator variable equal to one if a student switched schools on 
an indicator variable equal to one if the student won the KIPP Academy Lynn lottery. The dependent variable in the first row 
is one if a student ever moves from one observed school to another from 4th to 8th grade, either within a school year or 
between school years.  The dependent variable in the second row is one if a student switches schools between 5th and 6th 
grade; only observations where both schools are observed are used.  The dependent variables in the the third row is 1 if a 
student switches schools at any time besides the transition from 5th to 6th grade.  The regressions in column (2) include 
dummies for outcome grade, year of baseline, application grade, and application year interacted with a contemporaneous 
sibling applicant dummy.  Column (3) adds demographic variables, and column (4) adds baseline Math and ELA scores.   
The sample is restricted to cohorts for which we should observe follow-up test scores and excludes applicants with sibling 
priority.  Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.




































A.  Math Reduced Form
B. ELA Reduced Form
Notes:  This figure plots the coefficients from a regression of test scores on 
the lottery offer dummy interacted with dummies for grade of test*application 

















































Data for this project come from lottery records from KIPP Academy Lynn, student demographic
and school attendance information in the Massachusetts Student Information Management System
(SIMS), and test scores from the Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System (MCAS) state
database. This appendix describes these data sets and details the procedures used to clean and match
them.
A. Data Sets
KIPP Academy Lynn Lottery Data
Data description and sample restrictions
Our sample of applicants is drawn from records of the four lotteries that took place at KIPP
Academy Lynn from 2005 through 2008. These records include applicants' names, date of birth,
previous school and grade, and contact information for a parent, guardian, or the name of a sponsoring
organization such as the Lynn Boys Club. The rst ve rows of Table A2 summarize the raw lottery
data and sample restrictions used here. A few students who repeated grades were listed in the lottery
data to remind school sta to reserve an appropriate number of slots. These records are not included
in the analysis sample. We also excluded duplicate records. If a student applied to KIPP Academy
Lynn more than once, only the rst application is included. Late applicants (after lotteries) were
excluded as were siblings and students who went directly onto the waiting list (these are mostly 6th
grade applicants in early cohorts). Imposing these restrictions reduces the number of lottery records
from 629 to 542.
Coding the oer variable
Lottery records were used to reconstruct an indicator for whether applicants won the chance to
attend KIPP Lynn through the lottery process. We coded this from information on whether each
student attended KIPP Lynn in the year after the lottery, attempts to contact lottery winners, and
oers that were declined. Attempts to contact winners and declined oers were not always recorded;
we lled this in by reviewing each applicant record with school sta. Of the 542 randomized applicants
in our lottery sample, 350 were coded as receiving oers.
Student Information Management System Data
Data description
This project uses SIMS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2008-2009 school year.
Each year of data includes an October le and an end-of-year le. The SIMS records demographic and
19attendance information for all Massachusetts public school students. SIMS records refer to a student
in a school in a year, though there are some student-school-year duplicates for students that switch
grades or programs within a school and year.
Coding of demographics and attendance
The SIMS variables of interest include grade, year, name, town of residence, date of birth, sex, race,
special education (SPED) and limited English prociency (LEP) status, free/reduced price lunch, and
school attended. We constructed a wide-format data set that captures each student's demographic
information for each grade in which he or she is present in the SIMS data. This le uses the de-
mographic information from the longest-attended school in the rst calendar year encountered for
each grade. Attendance ties were broken at random (this aects only 0.014 percent of records). If a
student is classied as SPED, LEP, or qualied for free/reduced price lunch in any record within a
school-year-grade, then he or she is coded that way for the entire school-year-grade record.
KIPP Lynn attendance is measured in calendar years. A student was coded as attending KIPP
Lynn when there is any SIMS record for KIPP attendance in that year. Our analysis uses grade of
application as determined by the SIMS (as some parents record this incorrectly on lottery applications).
Massachusetts Comprehensive Assessment System Data
Data description and sample restrictions
This project uses MCAS data from the 2001-2002 school year through the 2008-2009 school year.
Each record in the MCAS data corresponds to a student's test results for a given grade and year. We
use Math and English Language Arts (ELA) tests from grades 4-8. Our outcome grades are 5-8, so
only tests taken in 2006-2007 or later are used for these grades; prior years give baseline (4th grade)
scores. We standardized scores to have mean zero and standard deviation one within a subject-grade-
year in Massachusetts. Repetitions of the same test subject and grade were dropped. In one case with
multiple records within a year and grade, scores were chosen at random.
B. Matching Data Sets
Match from the MCAS to the SIMS
The cleaned MCAS and SIMS les were merged by grade, year and a state student identier known
as the SASID. In grades 4-8, 99.3 percent of MCAS scores were matched to a student in the SIMS.
Scores that could not be matched to the SIMS were dropped.
20Match from the KIPP Academy Lynn lotteries to the SIMS/MCAS
Match procedure
Students in the lottery sample were matched to the SIMS data by name, pre-lottery grade, and
year. In some cases, this did not produce a unique match, most often in cases where the lottery data
were incomplete. We accepted some matches based on fewer criteria where the information on grade,
year, and town of residence seemed to make sense.
Match success rates
Table A1 reports match rates from lottery records to the SIMS/MCAS le. The overall match rate
is 91.3 percent (495 students out of 542). The match rate for oered students is 95.4 percent, while
it is 83.9 percent for students who did not receive an oer. The dierential is much lower for lottery
applicants coming from an LPS school; the match rates for the oered and non-oered students in this
subgroup are 96.4 percent and 93.4 percent, respectively. The dierentials quoted in the text come
from regressions of a match dummy on application year and LPS status (or just application year in
the sample coming from LPS).
Construction of the Outcome Data Set
The lottery/SIMS/MCAS matched sample includes 495 lottery applicants with demographic and test
score information. Of these, we use only students with baseline (4th grade) demographics in the
SIMS. We also exclude 10 applicants who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior to the lottery, leaving
a sample of 457 students. This is the sample of students used for the calculations reported in Table
2. Rows 6-8 of Table A2 summarize the impact of these restrictions on sample size.
Stacking grades
Outcome regressions stack grades and include multiple test scores for individual students. The
follow-up window closes in Spring 2009, generating dierences in the number of outcomes observed
across lottery cohorts. For example, a 4th grade applicant for the 2005-2006 school year contributes
5th grade through 8th grade scores, whereas we see 5th grade only for 2008 applicants. Years in KIPP
Lynn is dened as the number of school years spent at KIPP up to and including the outcome year.
Outcomes excluded from the sample
KIPP Lynn typically asked 5th grade applicants to repeat. These applicants might be expected
to do better on 5th grade MCAS tests just by virtue of repeating. We therefore assume that all 5th
grade applicants repeat and look only at their 6th grade and higher scores. We also drop a few 3rd
grade applicants. These restrictions reduce the sample to 419, eliminating 38 2008-9 applicants from
5th grade (and a handful from 3rd).
Final set of outcomes and students
21Table A3 summarizes the stacked analysis le. Of the 971 post-lottery outcomes we could hope to
observe for each subject, we found 865 for Math and 866 for ELA; 401 of our 419 remaining students
have at least one test score. These outcomes and students were used to produce the estimates in Table
4. For specications that control for baseline test scores, the sample sizes are further reduced to 856
outcomes for both Math and ELA; 4 students out of 401 lack baseline Math and ELA scores.
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Table A.1:  Match from KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data to SIMS
All applicants Applicants from Lynn Public School




Total Offered Not  offered
Number of 
students Total Offered Not offered
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2005-2006 122 0.943 0.955 0.833 103 0.971 0.968 1.000
2006-2007 102 0.931 0.971 0.848 76 0.934 0.963 0.864
2007-2008 143 0.916 0.955 0.852 100 0.960 0.971 0.935
2008-2009 175 0.880 0.939 0.828 117 0.949 0.947 0.950
All cohorts 542 0.913 0.954 0.839 396 0.955 0.964 0.934
Notes:  This table summarizes the match from the KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data to the SIMS.  The sample is restricted
that meet all criteria from Table A.1.  Columns (1)-(4) report statistics for all applicants, and columns (5)-(8) report statis
students whose previous schools in the KAL lottery data are part of the Lynn Public School system.successive 
ry data as 
hich a given student 
 eliminates students 
udes students 
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Table A.2:  KIPP Academy Lynn Lottery Records
Lottery cohort
2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 All lotteries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Total number of records 138 117 167 207 629
Excluding KIPP students and duplicates within year 138 117 162 205 622
Excluding repeat applicants 138 115 158 196 607
Excluding late/non-randomized applicants 127 110 155 194 586
Excluding siblings 122 102 143 175 542
Excluding students not matched to the SIMS 115 95 131 154 495
Excluding students without baseline demographics 110 86 127 144 467
Excluding 6th and 7th grade applicants 107 86 127 137 457
Excluding applicants who should not have a test score 107 86 127 99 419
Notes:  This table summarizes the raw KIPP Academy Lynn lottery data.  The top row gives the total number of records, and each 
row adds sample restrictions.  The second row eliminates KIPP Lynn students who repeat grades and are listed in the lotte
placeholders, as well as duplicate student records within a lottery year.  The third row keeps only the first lottery year in w
applies, and the fourth row excludes late (post-lottery) applicants as well as other non-randomized applicants.  The fifth row
with sibling priority.  The sixth row eliminates students who cannot be matched to the SIMS database.  The seventh row excl
without baseline (4th grade) demographics.  The seventh row excludes students who had completed 6th or 7th grade prior t
eighth row excludes students who should not have a non-repeat test score based on application grade and cohort (which e eighth row excludes st  who should not have   non-repeat test score based on application grade and cohort (which elim
grade applicants in 2008).Table A.3:  Outcome data for KIPP Academy Lynn Applicants
Number of 
students
Number with an 
observed test score
Number of test 
scores expected 
Math test scores 
observed
ELA test scores 
observed
Lottery cohort (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
2005-2006 107 105 405 357 361
2006-2007 86 84 238 212 211
2007-2008 127 122 229 206 204
2008-2009 99 90 99 90 90
All cohorts 419 401 971 865 866
Notes:  This table summarizes observed test score outcomes for KIPP Academy Lynn applicants.  The sample 
is restricted to randomized applicants who are matched to baseline (4th grade) SIMS demographics and who 
should have at least one test score.  6th and 7th grade applicants are excluded.  Column (2) reports the number 
of students for whom at least one outcome is observed.  Column (3) gives the number of test scores that should 
be observed (for both Math and ELA) given each applicant's lottery cohort and application grade.  Columns (4) 
and (5) report the numbers of Math and ELA outcomes that are observed in the data.e instrument
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Table A.4:  Alternative Instruments
Offer instrument Alternativ
First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS First Stage Reduced Form 2SLS
Subject Controls (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Math Basic 1.222*** 0.431*** 0.353*** 0.684*** 0.206*** 0.301***
(0.063) (0.116) (0.095) (0.039) (0.063) (0.089)
865 865 865 865 865 865
Demographics 1.232*** 0.392*** 0.318*** 0.687*** 0.185*** 0.269***
(0.065) (0.105) (0.084) (0.040) (0.057) (0.077)
865 865 865 865 865 865
Demographics & Ba
Scores
1 seline  .228*** 0.425*** 0.346*** 0.688*** 0.232*** 0.337***
(0.066) (0.066) (0.052) (0.040) (0.038) (0.051)
856 856 856 856 856 856
ELA Basic 1.223*** 0.183 0.150 0.685*** 0.081 0.118
(0.063) (0.117) (0.094) (0.039) (0.060) (0.086)
866 866 866 866 866 866
Demographics 1.235*** 0.118 0.095 0.689*** 0.050 0.072
(0.066) (0.097) (0.077) (0.039) (0.048) (0.067)
866 866 866 866 866 866
Demographics & Ba
S Scores
1 seline  .234*** 0.149** 0.120** 0.690*** 0.091** 0.131**
(0 066) 0.066) (0 073) 0.073) (0 058) 0.058) (0 0.039) (0 038) (0 054) 039) 0.038) 0.054)
856 856 856 856 856 856
Notes:   This table reports instrumental variables results similar to those in Table 4.  It is restricted to students with baseline demographic char
excludes applicants with sibling priority. Grades are pooled, and all regressions include grade dummies. Columns (1)-(3) report the firs
2SLS coefficients from instrumenting years in KIPP Lynn with the lottery offer dummy as in Table 4.  Columns (4)-(6) report results us
Lynn interacted with the offer dummy as the instrument.  Potential years in KIPP Lynn is calculated as the number of years a student w
attending KIPP Lynn in each post-lottery year until the outcome grade without repeating (except for 5th grade applicants, who are assum
Robust standard errors (clustered at the student level) are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%References
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